Communication in a collaborative problem-solving activity plays a pivotal role in the success of the collaboration in both academia and the workplace. Computer-supported collaboration makes it possible to collect large-scale communication data to investigate the process at a finer granularity. In this paper, we introduce a conditional transition profile (CTP) to characterize aspects of each team member's communication. Based on the data from a large-scale empirical study, we found that participants in the same team tend to show similar CTP compared (...) to participants from different teams. We also found that team members who showed more “negotiation” after the partner “shared” information tended to show more improvement after the collaboration while those who continued sharing ideas while their partners were negotiating tended to improve less. (shrink)

"This book is a sorely needed corrective. Animal Spirits is an important--maybe even a decisive--contribution at a difficult juncture in macroeconomic theory.

Of knowledge and probability: a quick tour of part 3, book 1. Of knowledge ; Of probability; and of the idea of cause and effect ; Why a cause is always necessary? ; Of the component parts of our reasonings concerning causes and effects ; Of the impressions of the senses and memory ; Of the inference from the impression to the idea ; Of the nature of the idea, or belief ; Of the causes of belief ; Of the (...) effects of other relations, and other habits ; Of the influence of belief ; Of the probability of chances ; Of the probability of causes ; Of unphilosophical probability ; Of the idea of necessary connexion ; Rules by which to judge of causes and effects ; Of the reason of animals -- Hume on unphilosophical probabilities -- Hume's skepticism with regard to reason -- Of skepticism with regard to the senses -- Of the ancient and modern philosophy -- The soul and the self -- The conclusion of book 1 -- Two openings and two closings. (shrink)

Arguing that criticisms have--from the very start--rested on misreadings, Fogelin begins by providing a narrative of the way Hume’s argument actually unfolds. What Hume’s critics (and even some of his defenders) have failed to see is that Hume’s primary argument depends on fixing the appropriate standards of evaluating testimony presented on behalf of a miracle. Given the definition of a miracle, Hume quite reasonably argues that the standards for evaluating such testimony must be extremely high. Hume then argues that, as (...) a matter of fact, no testimony on behalf of a religious miracle has even come close to meeting the appropriate standards for acceptance. (publisher, edited). (shrink)

The task of speaking the truth is an infinite labor: to respect it in its complexity is an obligation that no power can afford to shortchange, unless it would impose the silence of slavery (Foucault 1989, p. 308).... the attainment of truth is the outcome of the development of complex and elaborate methods of searching, methods that... in many respects go against the human grain, so they are adopted only after long discipline in a school of hard knocks (Dewey [1925] (...) 1988, pp. 234-35). (shrink)

The verse hinc subitae mortes atque intestata senectus has long fuelled considerable debate and discussion among classical scholars. This hexameter occurs in the passage of the first satire that describes the aspect of the patron-client relationship where the rich patron, ignoring the plight of his poor and hungry clients, enjoys a sumptuous but deadly feast. After dining on delicacies such as boar and peacock, he bathes on a bloated stomach, causing him to die suddenly and apparently intestate, and causing those (...) angry at being deprived of their legacy to cheer at his funeral :quanta est gula quae sibi totosponit apros, animal propter conuiuia natum!poena tamen praesens, cum tu deponis amictusturgidus et crudum pauonem in balnea portas.hinc subitae mortes atque intestata senectus.it noua nec tristis per cunctas fabula cenas;ducitur iratis plaudendum funus amicis. (shrink)

Thomas' theory of sin is a specification of his general theory of metaphysical evil. Both his theory of evil in general and his theory of moral evil specifically provide an understanding that constitutes a scientia, for both theories consist of an explanation of the four causes of evil. As a contrary of good, evil can be explained by means of its causes, for the scientia of good includes the understanding of the contrary of good. Thus sin can be understood precisely (...) as it is opposed to the good proper to rational creatures. ;The fact that Thomas's theory of evil consists of an explanation of its four causes is most evident in his Disputed Questions De malo. Thomas' explanation of moral evil parallels his explanation of metaphysical evil, as it demonstrates the four causes of sin in a similar fashion. Further, Thomas' theory of metaphysical evil provides the foundation for his explanation of moral evil; thus Thomas will apply the principles established concerning evil in general to the particular difficulties that arise in regard to the evil found in the rational creature. ;In his general theory of evil, Thomas determined that evil itself was not a thing, for there is no form or end proper to an evil nature. Evil can be understood according to the form that it opposes, and it is only found in some subject that properly possesses that form. Something that acts according to its end as a final cause may be the efficient cause of evil, either deficiently as it or the matter it acts upon is deficient, or as the good it acts for is accidentally an evil to another. The particular good that the efficient cause of evil intends or acts for, then, is a particular good that is in some way contrary to the particular good of some creature. In the case of sin, the will is the efficient cause of evil, as it intends something good, but there is some evil joined to it either accidentally or through its deficiency. Moral evil, then, is known by way of these causes. (shrink)

"The Natural System" is the abstract notion of the order in living diversity. The richness and complexity of this notion is revealed by the diversity of representations of the Natural System drawn by ornithologists in the Nineteenth Century. These representations varied in overall form from stars, to circles, to maps, to evolutionary trees and cross-sections through trees. They differed in their depiction of affinity, analogy, continuity, directionality, symmetry, reticulation and branching, evolution, and morphological convergence and divergence. Some representations were two-dimensional, (...) and some were three-dimensional; n-dimensional representations were discussed but never illustrated. The study of diagrammatic representations of the Natural System is made difficult by the frequent failure of authors to discuss them in their texts, and by the consequent problem of distinguishing features which carried meaning from arbitrary features and printing conventions which did not. Many of the systematics controversies of the last thirty years have their roots in the conceptual problems which surrounded the Natural System in the late 1800s, problems which were left unresolved when interest in higher-level systematics declined at the turn of this century. (shrink)

William Whewell (1794–1866), polymathic Victorian scientist, philosopher, historian, and educator, was one of the great neologists of the nineteenth century. Although Whewell's name is little remembered today except by professional historians and philosophers of science, researchers in many scientific fields work each day in a world that Whewell named. "Miocene" and "Pliocene," "uniformitarian" and "catastrophist," "anode" and "cathode," even the word "scientist" itself—all of these were Whewell coinages. Whewell is particularly important to students of the historical sciences for another word (...) he coined, one that was unfortunately not as successful as many of his others because it is difficult to pronounce. This word, "palaetiology," was the name Whewell gave to the class of sciences that are concerned with historical causation: the class we might today refer to as historical sciences. Although the disciplines Whewell included under the heading of palaetiology might seem to cut across conventional academic boundaries of his day and ours—his exemplary palaetiological sciences were geology and comparative philology—all these fields may be examined together, Whewell argued, because of their common interest in reconstructing the past. ¶ This paper is an essay in the palaetiological sciences, dedicated to Whewell on the bicentennial of his birth, an essay that examines some of the principles, maxims, and rules of procedure that these sciences have all in common. Its first purpose is to demonstrate the continuing validity of Whewell's classification of these sciences through a study of historical representation in three different palaetiological fields: systematics, historical linguistics, and textual transmission. Its second purpose is to continue the development of an extended analogy between historical representation and cartographic representation that I began in an earlier paper (O'Hara, 1993, Systematic Biology), an analogy that makes especially clear the common representational practices that are found throughout palaetiology. (shrink)

Classifications of animals and plants have long been represented by hierarchical lists of taxa, but occasional authors have drawn diagrammatic versions of their classifications in an attempt to better depict the "natural relationships" of their organisms. Ornithologists in 19th-century Britain produced and pioneered many types of classificatory diagrams, and these fall into three groups: (a) the quinarian systems of Vigors and Swainson (1820s and 1830s); (b) the "maps" of Strickland and Wallace (1840s and 1850s); and (c) the evolutionary diagrams of (...) the post-Darwin authors (1860 on). The quinarians distinguished between affinity and analogy and used both in their classifications, whereas Strickland rejected the quinarians' belief in numerical regularity and their use of analogy. Wallace's "maps" are easily given an evolutionary interpretation, and his approach was taken up and modified by later evolutionary anatomists. Sharpe returned to Strickland's methods and merely appended a superficial evolutionary interpretation. Contrary to common belief systematics has a rich conceptual history, and many of the conceptual developments in 19th-century systematics were made by ornithologists. (shrink)

We discuss two kinds of quotation, namely indirect quotation and pure quotation. With respect to each, we have both a negative and a positive plaint. The negative plaint is that the strict Davidsonian treatment of indirect and pure quotation cannot be correct. The positive plaint is an alternative account of how quotation of these two sorts works. /// Discutimos dos tipos de citas, a saber, citas indirectas y citas puras. Hacemos dos planteamientos, uno positivo y otro negativo, con respecto a (...) cada una. El negativo es que el tratamiento estrictamente davidsoniano de las citas indirectas y puras no puede ser correcto. El positivo consiste en dar una explicatión alternativa de cómo funcionan estos dos tipos de citas. (shrink)

John Henry Newman wrote the “Theses de Fide” in Rome as a seminary student in 1846/1847, and the text represents a key point in the development of his thought. Newman wrote the “Theses” in an attempt to grapple with scholastic categories on faith, a question that had occupied him in the Anglican Church for years. Although the “Theses” were not published in Newman’s life, he returned to these reflections often over the course of his Roman Catholic career. This edition and (...) partial translation of the “Theses de Fide” is to aid general readers in understanding this moment in Newman’s life, and to assist specialists in approaching the manuscript record of the “Theses” themselves. (shrink)

Alfred North Whitehead 's treatise Universal Algebra classifies algebras as either non-numerical or numerical according to whether they satisfy the law of idempotency, a + a = a. We undertake a technical critique of this classification scheme and examine how its flaws may reflect certain mathematical and philosophical biases in Whitehead 's outlook. We argue further that Whitehead 's presumption of immutable foundations for mathematics and his early commitment to the priority of objects over relations may in part account for (...) his relative obscurity as a mathematician. (shrink)

Ancient Chinese philosophical conceptions of intelligence differ markedly from those in the ancient Western tradition, and also from contemporary Western conceptions. Understanding these ancient Chinese conceptions of intelligence may help us better understand how a very important culture—Chinese culture—influences people's thinking and behavior, and may also help us broaden, deepen, as well as re-examine our own conceptions of intelligence. This article reviews two ancient Chinese conceptions of intelligence–the Confucian and Taoist– and discusses their ramifications for current thinking about intelligence and (...) its role in the world. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

James's ethical thought could frequently be consequentialist, but it could also on occasion show a deontological side, or "streak," as I contended in "William James on the Courage to Believe". This shows up when he speaks of the "strenuous" as against the "easy-going" moral mood, in "The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life," and it preserves the precursive intervention of our "passional natures" in "The Will to Believe" from lapsing into "wishful thinking." Toned down slightly, perhaps, in "Varieties of Religious (...) Experience", it reasserts itself in "Pragmatism", and, it could be shown, in James's succeeding works as well. (shrink)

Robert Roth, among the first few Catholics to write favorably, even if critically, about American pragmatism, presents here a creative piece of comparative philosophy in which he achieves a long-term goal of attempting a reconciliation between pragmatism and a classical spiritual and religious perspective. The title, Radical Pragmatism, is an adaptation of William James’s "radical empiricism." James had argues that the classical empiricists, Locke and Hume, did not go far enough in their account of experience. They missed some of (...) its most important aspects, namely connections and relations, and as a result they were left with discrete sense data and sense objects. (shrink)

This book explores the principal issues involved in bridging the gap between the pure theory of consumer behavior and its empirical implementation. The authors focus upon the structure of preferences, the treatment of demographic variables, the treatment of dynamics, and the specification of the stochastic structure of the demand system.

We study a class of representation mechanisms, based on reports made by a random subset of agents, called representatives, in a collective choice problem with quasi-linear utilities. We do not assume the existence of a common prior probability describing the distribution of preference types. In addition, there is no benevolent planner. Decisions will be carried out by an individual who cannot be assumed impartial, a self-interested executive. These assumptions impose new constraints on Mechanism Design. A robust mechanism is defined as (...) maximizing expected welfare under a vague prior probability distribution, and over a set of mechanisms which is at the same time immune from opportunistic manipulations by the executive, and compatible with truthful revelation of preferences by representatives. Robust mechanisms are characterized and their existence is shown. Sampling Groves mechanisms are shown to be robust. (shrink)

This chapter lays out Agrippa's Five Modes Leading to the Suspension of Belief as they are found in Sextus Empiricus's Outlines of Pyrrhonism. The five modes are discrepancy, regress ad infinitum, relativity, hypothesis, and circular reasoning. In the Pyrrhonist's hands, these five modes are used to show that any effort at justifying philosophical beliefs is bound to fail. On the contemporary scene, three of these modes, arbitrary assumption, infinite regress, and circular reasoning are set up as a challenge to be (...) met by a theory of justification. We get various kinds of theories of justification depending on how this challenge is met. (shrink)

Externalist analyses of knowledge are motivated, at least in part, by the fact that in Gettier examples, S, the person who claims to know p, is right in believing that p, but only as a matter of luck. The most natural way of ruling out these lucky hits on the truth is to demand that S's belief must stand in the right sort of causal relationship to the fact believed. The chapter examines an early version of this approach offered by (...) Goldman. It also examines BonJour's objections to any purely causal account of knowledge. (shrink)

This chapter examines Davidson's attempt to develop a coherentist response to skepticism within an externalist or reliabilist framework. His position has two main components. The first depends on the principle of charity: In interpreting the utterances of others, we must assume that most of that person's beliefs are true. It thus makes no sense to attribute massive error to people whose utterances we are trying to interpret. For similar reasons, it is incoherent to entertain the possibility that one's own beliefs (...) are massively in error. The second component in Davidson's response to skepticism involves his externalist semantics. In a context where one person is acquiring a concept from someone who already possesses it, the conditions for a belief's being the belief it is can be the same as the conditions for the belief's being true. Beliefs of this kind, Davidson thinks, are immune to skeptical attack. In response, the chapter challenges the transition from the third‐ to the first‐person argument and notes that the semantic argument provides only limited protection from skepticism. (shrink)

Having completed the examination of competing accounts of how knowledge claims function, this chapter returns to and elaborates the account presented of them in Ch. 1. In our everyday use of knowledge claims, we rely on justificatory procedures that we have learned. Looking things up is an obvious example. Doubts also take place within justificatory procedures. We doubt things because they fail to meet certain standards. Three sorts of doubt are distinguished: hyperbolic doubts, eliminable but impractical doubts, and eliminable legitimate (...) doubts. In daily life, we operate at the third or lowest level of scrutiny. When engaged in doing epistemology, however, philosophers tend to operate at the two higher levels of scrutiny with the result that they encounter Gettier problems or wind up in skepticism. This sets the stage for Part 2 in which various responses to skepticism are examined. (shrink)

This chapter examines Gettier's objections to defining knowledge as justified true belief – the so‐called Gettier problems. In response to these objections, a distinction is drawn between two kinds of justification. A person can be justified in coming to believe that p if he has been epistemically responsible in doing so. This is how Gettier understands justification. A person can also be justified in the sense that he commands grounds or reasons that establish the truth of p. Knowledge claims are, (...) however, sensitive to levels of scrutiny. What counts as adequate grounds in one context may not in another because of its nonstandard features. Gettier problems in all their forms arise when a person, S, responsibly judges that p, but in a context where we, who are privy to information S lacks, see that his grounds do not meet the standards appropriate for the situation he in fact is in. (shrink)

Coherentists attempt to solve the problem of infinite regress by rejecting what they sometimes call “the linear conception of knowledge.” Coherentists adopt, instead, a holistic conception of justification. This chapter examines BonJour's efforts to develop a coherentist account of empirical knowledge. BonJour faces two tasks: the first is to specify the conditions for a system of beliefs to be coherent, the second is to provide an argument showing that a system possessing these features provides justification for the beliefs it contains. (...) To be coherent, according to BonJour, a system must be both logically and probabilistically consistent, be rich in inferential connections, not be divided into isolated subsystems, and be free of anomalies. Finally, to be justified in believing something, a person must be able recognize that his belief has this status in his system of beliefs. This position is criticized on a number of grounds. It seems to have the consequence that no human being has ever been justified in any of his empirical beliefs. Nothing seems to rule out the multiple‐choice problem of there being two equally coherent but incompatible systems of belief. (shrink)

The introduction offers a brief sketch of Pyrrhonian skepticism as it is presented in the works of Sextus Empiricus, and of competing interpretations of the scope of the Pyrrhonian doubt. Using terms derived from Galen, some read Sextus as a rustic skeptic, others read him as an urbane skeptic. On the rustic interpretation adopted by Jonathan Barnes, Miles Burnyeat, and others, the goal of Pyrrhonism is to attain suspension of belief on all matters, including the beliefs of everyday life. On (...) the urbane reading given by Michael Frede, the target of skeptical doubt is limited to dogmatic philosophizing and closely related activities. Arguments are presented for adopting the urbane interpretation – the perspective from which this work is written. (shrink)

The central thesis of Part 2 of this study is that no justificatory theory seems to show any prospects of solving the Agrippa problem. Does this show that there is no fact of the matter in knowing? At restricted levels of scrutiny, there are facts of the matter in knowing. However, if the Agrippa problem cannot be solved, then in the sense in which philosophers have sought a fact of the matter, it seems that there is none. Pyrrhonism or Neopyrrhonism (...) seems to be the terminating point of the epistemological enterprise. As indicated in the introduction, Pyrrhonism is taken to be urbane, not rustic. The Pyrrhonist is not concerned with the everyday use of words like “know,” “certain,” and “justified,” which are not freighted with extreme philosophical commitments. He can use them as freely as anyone. (shrink)